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1) Introduction: 
Academic philosophers who have a research passion for Peirce and who suspect that he 
has the potential to revolutionize philosophy sometimes wonder how they might bring his 
ideas more into the teaching of undergraduates − where he frequently doesn’t feature at 
all, except in the US where a token coverage of his early papers seems to result largely 
from patriotism.  
     Much could be said about specific Peircean ideas and theories which, if included in 
philosophy curricula, would expand and complicate the vision of philosophy to which 
students are exposed, and would most likely be greatly appreciated by many who feel 
troubled and undermined by a sense of narrowness in the current curriculum which they 
lack the resources to articulate.1   Just a few examples are Peirce’s understanding of 
pragmatism as a faith in the capacity of experimentation to deliver stable answers to our 
questions which − in ironic contrast to an understanding of pragmatism as a claim of 
‘anything-goes’ −  is in fact the most complete form of realism, his belief in final causes 
and its potential to resurrect ethical realism against positivism’s lingering nihilist 
onslaught, his distinctive objective idealism, so illuminatingly intermingled with his 
vision of (mathematical, logical and metaphysical) ‘continuity’, his belief in real chance, 
and his most elegant and ambitious theory of signs. 
     Having said all this, however, in my opinion the most valuable legacy Peirce has 
given me as a teacher of undergraduate philosophy is not any of his theories but one of 
his instructions. I speak of course of his pragmatic maxim: 
 
                                                 
1 At the risk of sounding overly dramatic, as not all of these students remain in the profession, this is an 
issue of ‘life or death’ career-wise.  
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“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object.” (Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.2). 
 
Increasingly I have come to feel that if pragmatism makes no conceivable difference to 
my teaching practice, teaching it involves me in a performative contradiction.   
     Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which concerns itself with knowledge (at 
least etymologically). We often advertise epistemology courses promising that we will 
address such questions as:  
• What is reality?  
• When and how can we say that we have knowledge of reality?  
• Is knowledge, or what is real, relative to a cultural perspective? 
Many students enrol with enthusiasm to explore these questions. The life-stage of a 
typical undergraduate is often very stressful and confusing, involving decisions about 
lifelong career path, a first engagement with adult relationships, and further issues of 
significance. In the face of this, surely a greater understanding of what is and is not 
known, and what is and is not real would help, it is thought. 
     However what do these students commonly encounter? An introduction to 
epistemology via a question of global skepticism, which, it is claimed, derives from 
Descartes, “the father of modern philosophy”. If global skepticism could be put in the 
form of a question, it would be something like: 
GS1: Is the entire world real or is the entire world not real? 
GS2: Do we know what we think we know or do we know nothing at all? 
At this point, key texts either emphasize the questions and their overwhelming 
difficulty,2  or begin proffering the author’s own answers3 (arguably replacing global 
                                                 
2 Just a few examples: “The skeptical conclusion is that knowledge is impossible. No one does know, 
because no one can know.” Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Wiley, 1991), 
p. 1.  
     “Philosophical skepticism[‘s] essential element is a general view about human knowledge….the 
philosophical sceptic holds, or at least finds irrefutable, the view that knowledge is impossible.” Michael 
Williams, “Skepticism”, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Wiley, 2007), p. 35. 
     “General epistemology will be concerned with questions, such as…‘Are there general reasons to think 
knowledge of any kind is unobtainable?’ David Cooper, Epistemology: The Classic Readings (Blackwell, 
1999), p. 2 
3 Again, a few examples chosen at random: “As I look at the green field before me, I might believe not only 
that there is a green field there but also that I see one. And I do see one. I visually perceive it…Both beliefs, 
the belief that there is a green field there, and the self-referential belief that I see one, are grounded, 
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skepticism with global dogmatism). Of course some philosophers do critique the central 
role given to global skepticism in epistemology4, but such nuances rarely find their way 
into introductory courses in the subject. 
                                                                                                                                                
     If we return to the pragmatic maxim, what conceivable practical5 difference does it 
make in the life of a typical undergraduate if the answers to questions GS1 and GS2 are 
yes or no? For instance, if the entire world is not real, how might this affect my choice of 
career? One could argue at great length about whether any two issues are really 
unconnected if one only does enough philosophy, and about the desirability of pursuing 
‘Topics of Vital Importance’ as opposed to general questions considered for their own 
sake. However in the context of teaching introductory philosophy, the bottom line is that 
in my experience students can’t see connections between GS1 and GS2 and their own 
experience, even if they try quite hard. Therefore I am embarrassed to teach this material. 
The worst consequence, in my opinion, is that as the best students usually desire to 
follow and please the teacher, when presented with this material they learn to feign 
interest in questions which they cannot connect to any possible experience. This impacts 
profoundly on their philosophical development. From the Peircean perspective, which 
seeks to find and foster ‘living’ over ‘paper’ doubt, this is arguably a form of intellectual 
corruption, and as such a betrayal of students’ trust. 
 
causally, justificationally, and epistemically, in my visual experience. They are produced by that experience, 
justified by it, and constitute knowledge in virtue of it.” Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1998), p, 14.  
     “Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist who, although 
writing well before the Enlightenment, had the courage and audacity to challenge the validity of all his 
beliefs, including his belief in God. Ironically, in pursuing the farthest reaches of what can be doubted, 
Descartes found the basis of knowledge itself.” Linda Martin Alcoff (ed), Epistemology: The Big Questions 
(Blackwell, 1998), p. 3.   
4 Thus for instance, John Greco denies that the task of epistemology should any longer consist in refuting 
skepticism in his introduction to the Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (2007). Barry Stroud writes, 
“Scepticism is most illuminating when restricted to particular areas of knowledge ... because it then rests on 
distinctive and problematic features of the alleged knowledge in question, not simply on some completely 
general conundrum in the notion of knowledge itself…”, Barry Stroud,  “Scepticism, ‘Externalism’, and the 
Goal of Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1994), p. 291. Christopher Hookway’s 
book Scepticism also deserves mention for a careful rereading of Descartes which plausibly suggests that 
even he did not advocate the kind of global skepticism typically put forward in introductory epistemology 
classes. Hookway and others are part of a recent trend towards ‘virtue epistemology’ (inspired by 
pragmatism, insights from virtue ethics and feminist critiques of traditional epistemology) which seeks to 
replace investigation into knowledge with investigation of knowers and their ‘intellectual character’. But 
the question remains how these new theories might affect teaching practice. 
5 The meaning of ‘practical’ here includes barring clearly pathological responses, such as refusing to act, or 
ending one’s life. 
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     Therefore I have been experimenting with other options for teaching epistemology, 
guided by the pragmatic maxim. It seems to me that rather than presenting general 
questions and theories, and merely hoping that students will make the connection to 
specific examples which will render the general material meaningful, it is imperative to 
(at least some of the time) start from specific examples, ensure students are thinking 
about them, and move from there towards general questions and theories. Therefore, here 
is a teaching experiment I have devised. I invite you to try it in your own classroom and 
see what happens.6 
 
2) The Exercise: 
i) Props: 
First I produce slips of paper and invite the students to select one each. (Rhetorically, this 
already creates an air of mystery and direct engagement, a bit like a reality TV show.) 
Each slip contains a word or phrase describing one ‘thing’. Here is my list: 
i. a tree 
 
ii. the number five 
 
iii. the color red 
 
iv. your friendship with your best friend 
 
v. a song (think of an example…) 
 
vi. a website 
 
vii. World War Two 
 
viii. the New Zealand dollar 
 
ix. a book (e.g. ‘Moby Dick’) 
 
x. Gandalf 
 
xi. a hammer 
 
xii. the time you will wake up tomorrow 
 
xiii. the last dream you can remember having 
 
xiv. a marriage 
                                                 
6 I would also be most interested to hear your ‘experimental results’. Feel free to email them to me: 
clegg@waikato.ac.nz. 
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xv. pain 
 
xvi. the word ‘cat’ 
 
xvii. fashionability (coolness) 
 
xviii. Mount Everest 
 
xix. Queen Elizabeth the First 
 
ii) Instructions: 
Once they all have slips of paper, I give them a two-stage set of instructions as to 
what to do with them. In the first stage I ask that they each come to a decision on 
their own about whether the item on their slip is: 
• ‘real’,  
• ‘not real’,  
• ‘partly real’ (in which case say which part) 
• ‘it depends’ (in which case say what ‘it’ depends on). 
This ensures that each student has done at least some thinking of their very own about 
one specific example (for which they are uniquely responsible). I also ask them to ‘give a 
reason’ for their answer. This instruction is intended to start the philosophical process − 
asking for ‘a reason’ being the most unthreatening and natural way I have found to do 
this. I typically allocate this stage 5-10 minutes. 
     Students’ consideration of the items above in this light will be found to spontaneously 
give rise to many classic philosophical issues. For instance, xix) and xii) raise the 
questions of the reality of the past and future, while x) broaches the reality of fictional 
characters. Issues of functionalist as opposed to classically materialist identity can be 
explored via xi) for artifacts and i) for living things. Interesting questions (arguably 
neglected by mainstream philosophy) surround the nature and reality of ‘social forms’ 
such as marriage and the NZ dollar. Related are issues of the reality of signs which arise 
from songs, words, websites and books, along with some rather insistent and intriguing 
token – type issues. (By ‘Moby Dick’ do we mean an individual book copy, or do we 
mean something more, and if so, what?) Finally, xiii) and xv) link to classic Cartesian 
questions concerning the reality and reliability of individual experience. 
 5
     In the second stage, I get them in groups of four (a number I have found to be large 
enough to generate a genuine discussion on an interesting range of examples, but small 
enough that all students in the group are likely to participate), and ask them to devise a 
joint definition of the term ‘real’. I stress that their definition must ‘cover all the things 
you said were real, and not cover any of the things you said were not real’. They will 
inevitably find this an extremely challenging task! I drift randomly past groups and listen, 
fostering discussion by asking questions, or dropping in a new slip of paper with a further 
example for them to incorporate. I also deliver a wealth of encouragement, assuring them 
that the exercise is hard, and that engaging in the discussion process is the most important 
thing, though it might feel uncomfortable at first as they are probably used to being told 
more what to think than is currently happening. The last time I tried this exercise, 
however, the students engaged happily in discussion for the rest of the class (around 35 
minutes), and I had to interrupt them to clear the room for the next class (a rare 
occurrence at my University).  
 
iii) Follow-up: 
The biggest challenge with this kind of exercise is the converse of that of traditional 
teaching – namely making the link from specific examples and discussions back to those 
canonical general ideas and theories with which we feel it is our duty to acquaint students. 
To this end, I have devised a follow-up exercise. In the next class I get each group to state 
the best definition of reality they can agree on, list them all on the board and encourage 
general discussion on which definition might be the best (and, importantly, why). 
Facilitating such an exercise is not easy as I find by this point the groups have generated 
such a profusion of interesting philosophical arguments on different topics that 
integrating them can be quite a challenge. With practice, however, one learns to 
harmonize and develop some useful maximum of the contributions, using something like 
the philosophical equivalent of jazz improvisation (where traditional teaching is a 
classical music performance).  
     It is very useful to write down and keep the definitions as a resource to refer back to in 
future classes. (For example, when introducing Berkeley one might say, “You remember 
how in the first class one group defined reality as …Berkeley agrees with this insofar 
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as…”7). I confess that although I am now committed to beginning epistemology courses 
with exercises such as these, at present I revert to something much closer to traditional 
lecturing style after the initial two classes. Entirely structuring an epistemology course 
from specific living examples to general theories would be an interesting experiment − 
perhaps something of a Holy Grail of pragmatist teaching. As mentioned above, one 
would have to let the presently canonical theories of academic epistemology fall where 
they may and it is an interesting question how much would survive and whether that 
would be a good or bad thing.8 
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